

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

6 March 1981

NOTE FOR:

FROM : A/NIO/W

SUBJECT : Agenda for March NIC Warning
Meeting

Attached agenda is for your information.

Attachment

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6 March 1981

NIC Warning Agenda for MarchI. Poland

Assumption: Indications listed in the February NIC warning agenda that a crack down on Solidarity militants and KOR leaders was imminent did not represent a bluff. The hardline faction in the Polish leadership, with Soviet support, was pressing Kania to execute the commitment to confront Solidarity that he made at the Warsaw Pact summit on 5 December. Kania preempted this attempt to force a change in party policy (and to oust Kania if he resisted) by elevating Minister of Defense Jaruzelski to the premiership, thus invoking the support of the Polish Army against the hardliners.

A. This fait accompli surprised and angered the Soviets and generated considerable strains in Polish-Soviet relations. It has at least temporarily neutralized the hardline faction as an instrument of Soviet influence.

B. Moscow thus faces a major policy dilemma: It must either (1) acquiesce in Kania's efforts to ease the crisis by working toward an accommodation with Solidarity and the Church, or (2) persist in attempts to compel Kania to adopt tougher tactics.

C. Kania anticipates that Moscow will maintain pressure for a change in policy. In an effort to deflect pressures from domestic policy, he is stressing Poland's devotion to its alliance commitments. Thus he recited the litany of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" in his speech to the Soviet Party Congress and in the statement following talks with the Soviet leaders on 4 March.

D. If Kania's maneuvers fail, and if future developments in Poland cause the Soviets to fear that the Polish party's control is in jeopardy or its alliance commitments are being brought into question, Moscow may resort to more risky measures ranging from an attempt to organize a coup to remove Kania and Jaruzelski to the use of military intimidation.

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E. Warsaw Pact exercise Soyuz-81 in mid-March may provide the next test. There is some indication that the exercise will include a field training phase in Poland.

1. Although Kania probably is highly displeased with Moscow's decision to proceed with the exercise at this time, it seems likely that the Poles will treat Soyuz-81 as a routine exercise and take special precautions to avoid incidents involving Soviet, Czechoslovak, or East German personnel.

2. Czechoslovak precedent? There might be a sinister Soviet motive in conducting a phase of the exercise in Poland. The possibility cannot be excluded that the Soviets anticipate a negative reaction by Solidarity and the public. They might intend to exploit such reactions as justification for harsher pressures on Kania for a change in policy.

3. It is worth recalling the role Warsaw Pact exercises played in the runup to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The authoritative Pravda editorial on 22 August 1968 justifying the invasion included the charge that:

"An unfriendly campaign was launched against the presence (in June 1968) on Czechoslovak territory of military units of the socialist countries which were brought there for the duration of military staff exercises. The presence of Soviet military contingents was depicted by the antisocialist and rightwing forces as occupation of Czechoslovak territory. Does this look like respect for allied obligations within the framework of the Warsaw Pact? No, this is more like a desire to make the functioning of military mechanisms of the Warsaw Pact organization, in practice, more difficult. This is not the way a country which honors allied obligations it had assumed should behave. Only a country which ignores those obligations can act in this manner. Members of the Warsaw Pact could not fail to draw corresponding conclusions."

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II. El Salvador - Cuba - USSR

Assumptions: Castro is pondering a range of ripostes to US pressures on Cuba to halt arms shipments to Salvadoran leftists. Although his Soviet benefactors are ambivalent about direct Cuban moves to defy Washington, they may sanction actions in the next few weeks to call what they interpret as a US bluff.

A. The Soviets and Cubans believe that sentiment in Western Europe, Mexico, Venezuela and Panama favoring a political solution presents an opportunity for actions aimed at embarrassing the US and blunting its efforts to place El Salvador in the context of East-West relations and Soviet/Cuban intentions.

B. Moscow and Havana feel considerable pressure to respond because they perceive US initiatives on El Salvador as a direct challenge to their policies and pretensions.

1. After the Sandinista revolution in 1979, the Soviets moved away from their cautious policy in Latin America since the early 1960s and began to encourage Communist parties in Central America to follow the Sandinista model. US disclosure of the Soviet role in El Salvador, moreover, has raised Moscow's stake in the outcome.

2. Since President Reagan's election, the Soviets and Cubans have been anticipating a more assertive US policy to thwart Communist support for Central American revolutionary groups. (Castro attempted to influence the November election in favor of President Carter by suspending the refugee boatlift in September and by granting a general pardon in October to Americans imprisoned in Cuba.)

3. In his 26 July speech last summer, Fidel attacked the Republican Party platform positions on Cuba and warned that such measures, if carried out, would lead to war between the US and Latin America.

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4. Chief of Staff Ogarkov's visit to Cuba in early February provided an opportunity for consultations on tactics for dealing with expected US initiatives. Ogarkov publicly urged Cuban forces to increase "combat readiness" and said the Soviet Union would "do everything necessary to prevent rash actions against fraternal countries."

C. Possible Cuban/Soviet Courses of Action:

1. Limit initial responses to propaganda efforts to discredit US intentions and play for time in the expectation of a rightist military coup to remove civilians in the Salvadoran junta. The Cubans and Soviets may believe that the Socialist International's efforts to promote a peaceful solution will galvanize rightist officers to oust Duarte.

2. Encourage further offers by the Revolutionary Democratic Front to negotiate a political settlement. Unco's 27 February offer to hold a dialogue was aimed at calling Duarte's bluff and at deepening the suspicions of rightist officers.

3. Maintain arms deliveries via sea and air to Nicaragua in the expectation that this will force the US to take action to halt this traffic.

a. Castro told the Soviet Party Congress that "we are openly threatened with a military blockade...."

4. If the US imposes a naval and/or air "quarantine" to halt arms shipments, the Cubans will deliberately provoke incidents.

a. Castro may try to "saturate" a naval quarantine by dispatching an armada of vessels to violate the quarantine and force the US to halt and board Cuban craft. [REDACTED]

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5. After Cuban challenges to a US naval quarantine create an international

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uproar, Havana will seek other means to "prove" that the US is threatening (as Castro told the Soviet Congress) "even more drastic measures" to "obliterate the example of socialist Cuba from Latin America and to punish the Cuban people for their friendship with the USSR...."

a. Attacks on alleged US "spy planes." [REDACTED]

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- b. Contrive a takeover threat to the US Interests Section in Havana by Cubans seeking to emigrate. The government recently claimed the right to enter any diplomatic mission to restore order if its staff has lost control.
- c. Stage incidents along the perimeter of the Guantanamo Naval Base. (In mid-December, Cuban security and military forces increased activities near the base. There were reports of a movement of troops from Havana to Guantanamo City and then to Boqueron near the base.)

III. Iran-Iraq

Assumption: Tehran will soon have to make some hard decisions regarding the war with Iraq. If the Islamic Conference Mediation Committee fails to achieve even a modest break in the impasse on a negotiated settlement, the Iranians will have to contend with a new Iraqi offensive, perhaps as early as April.

A. At that point, Iran will have to decide either to (1) expand the war into the Gulf in an attempt to induce US/Western diplomatic intervention to end the conflict; (2) rely on a holding action on the assumption that decisive Iraqi military successes can be averted; or (3) make political concessions sufficient to open the

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way to a ceasefire and negotiations.

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C. Despite the urgent need for policy decisions, Iranian factions may be unable to agree on any strategy for ending the war. Clerical hardliners continue to advocate continuation of the war until Saddam Hussein is overthrown. Bani-Sadr's war aims are limited primarily to recovering Khuzestan. Other territorial disputes could be resolved on the basis of the Algiers Accords. General Fallahi, deputy commander of the joint staff, who supports Bani-Sadr, has suggested a ceasefire followed by an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal. But hardliner Nabavi has denounced Fallahi's statement, saying the government had never agreed to such a ceasefire proposal.

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